This paper assesses the impact of housing market conditions on the theoretically motivated and empirically observed negative relationship between loan to value ratios and home maintenance expenditures. If the relationship is causal, then a down housing market will result in significantly decreased upkeep in the housing stock. The large rise and fall in home prices during the 2001-2009 period allows a unique opportunity to analyze the response of homeowners to changing housing market conditions. Data from the American Housing Survey is analyzed to confirm previous work that a negative relationship exists between loan to value ratios and routine maintenance expenditures; however, this relationship does not move in the expected direction when examined along with temporal variations in market conditions. Panel analysis reveals a more complex story. Households most likely to be at risk for default do decrease maintenance expenditures when default risk increases, but other households actually increased maintenance expenditures when the housing market conditions became less favorable.
Introduction
Many neighborhood-level attributes are provided largely through unmonitored voluntary contributions on the part of the neighborhood residents. Examples include the aesthetic appearance of the neighborhood, the supervision of neighborhood children, the care with which residents drive through the streets and participation in neighborhood social activities. These local public goods together create varying levels of neighborhood quality, which in turn impacts the well-being of neighborhood residents and is capitalized into neighborhood home prices. When neighborhoods improve many improved outcomes are possible--property values increase (Dubin, 1992) , neighborhoods become more aesthetically pleasing (Leonard et al, 2010) , socializing among residents is more likely (Sampson, 2003) , neighborhood children often benefit from improved stability (Shaefer-McDaniel 2009 ), physical activity is more likely as the neighborhood is more "walkable" (Saelens et al 2003; Sallis & Glanz, 2006) , and communities benefit from increased tax revenue. Likewise, the opposite can be said of neighborhoods in decay.
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the housing market determinants of local public good provision by analyzing the relationship between default risk-in both up and down housing markets--and routine maintenance expenditures. While the real-estate and housing economics literature has largely focused on the private benefits of home maintenance due to its large consumptive component (Harding, Rosenthal et al. 2007 ), property upkeep may also be thought of as an impure public good because it produces neighborhood externalities. Reduced exterior maintenance detracts from neighborhood aesthetics and any type of reduce maintenance may indirectly reduce neighborhood home prices because homes that are not maintained properly generally sell at a discount. These discounted sell prices then become part of the neighborhood comparables upon which future sell prices are assessed (Vandell 1991) . Economic theory suggests that defaulted home mortgage loans present a market failure whereby owners who default (or are at great risk of default) have reduced incentive to maintain their property. Therefore, there is likely a close link between housing market conditions and the provision of property upkeep. This linkage is particularly concerning when considering the externalities associated with home maintenance. While much of the cost of decreased maintenance is private, even a small proportion that generates negative neighborhood externalities could produce detrimental pro-cyclical influences on neighborhoods if a declining market reduces public good contributions that then cause further market price declines.
While evidence suggests high LTV loans and/or high default risk lead to decreased property upkeep (Harding, Miceli et al. 2000) , the response of homeowners to changes in housing market conditions is unknown. In a depreciating market, low-equity homeowners are exposed to much greater default risk than in an appreciating market.
However, it is unknown if this variation in default risk caused by market depreciation translates into behavioral changes on the part of neighborhood residents. The rapid rise and subsequent decline in home prices from 2001 through 2009 provides a natural experiment for the testing of this relationship.
The next section begins by developing a conceptual model to explain the influence of default risk on local public good contributions. The empirical investigation (Section 4) utilizes American Housing Survey (AHS) data that is described in Section 3 to estimate both cross sectional and panel models of routine maintenance expenditures.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Background
Neighborhood residents provide local neighborhood public goods through activities such as property upkeep and residents that are homeowners often have significant wealth invested in neighborhood housing. Household budgets matter for provision decisions because they determine the stock of resources available to invest in local public goods, and they are themselves influenced by public good provision through property values. Therefore, household behavior with regards to the provision of local neighborhood public goods is likely related to the role of housing in the household's budget.
Housing is generally one of the largest and most high-risk components of a household's portfolio and significantly impacts household financial decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that households deal with the risk associated with housing investments by reducing stock-holdings (Cocco, 2005; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) and sorting out of the housing market during times of increased volatility (Turner, 2003) . Additionally, home equity is tapped to smooth consumption during times of financial stress (Hurst and Stafford, 2004) . Finally, as previously mentioned housing also provides consumption benefits. Housing then has three key functions in the homeowner's portfolio: it is a risky asset which pays dividends; it is a form of "forced savings" because equity is often costly to withdraw, but can be used to weather income shortfalls; and it is consumed. When home equity is high it can help smooth fluctuations in public good provision; but when equity is low, public good provision may be adversely affected.
The current equity stake in a property may be measured by subtracting the current loan to value ratio (LTV) from 1. Thus a high LTV is indicative of a low equity stake in the property. However, we should consider the degree to which equity stake is known by the homeowner. The outstanding loan value is information that at least is easily attainable-usually from the monthly mortgage bill. However, the value of the house is often only estimable with a degree of error. Further, default risk--defined as the probability that default or foreclosure will occur--is positively correlated with LTV, but there are also other factors involved. The likelihood of default usually depends upon the full household budget constraint, the term structure of interest rates, housing market conditions and the likelihood of "trigger events" which cause a sudden change in a household's financial situation. LTV only provides insight into the housing component of household budgets. Due to the complexity of assessing default risk (Kau and Keenan 1995; Vandell 1995; Avery, Bostic et al. 1996) , it is likely that knowledge of default risk exposure is unknown to many homeowners; or becomes known only when default risk is very high or very low. Previous empirical work generally supports the conclusion that default events lead to decreased neighborhood home prices (Harding, Rosenblatt & Yao, 2010; Lin et al., 2008; Leonard & Murdoch, 2009; Immergluck & Smith, 2005; and Cotterman, 2001 ). Leonard & Murdoch (2009) propose that these changes may occur through a decrease in local public good contributions and this mechanism is supported by the timing of the price impacts of foreclosure (Harding, Rosenblatt et al. 2009 ). This suggests that when default occurs maintenance decreases, but it is unknown if there is a smooth transition whereby maintenance decreases with increases in default risk.
A Model of Residential Property Upkeep
Harding et al (2000) extends the model of Henderson and Ioannides (1983) , which results in a two-period expected utility maximization problem in which utility depends on housing utilization. The optimal utilization rate occurs when the marginal benefit of housing utilization equals the present value of marginal maintenance costs.
The intuition gleamed from the model is that a market failure will occur when the full marginal costs of home utilization (e.g. maintenance costs) cannot be assessed to the occupant of the house. This occurs in the case of rental properties as well as properties at risk of default. This model suggests a negative relationship between household maintenance expenditures and default risk.
A Conceptual Model of Default Risk
Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) present the theory for determining default risk by examining default as the realization of a homeowner's intertemporal optimization decision. While much of the literature is concerned with the solution of the mortgage valuation problem (Kau and Keenan 1995) , this, though necessary for determining the space over which default probabilities are positive, provides the dollar value of default
and not the probability of default-the primary concern for this analysis. The probability of "optimal" default for a given house price, interest rate and LTV is a function of values of the interest rate (r) and house price (Q) in the future (Kau, Keenan et al. 1994 ) and occurs only when the mortgage valuation is sufficiently low, or in the default region (D).
where s is the current time.
(1)
The time path of interest rate and house prices necessary to solve the Kolmogorov backward partial differential equation (see Kau, Keenan et al. 1994 for more details) that defines the probability are given by
and
The term structure of the interest rate (r) is described by a stochastic, mean reverting process where γ is the rate of reversion to the steady-state value, θ, and σ r provides the volatility of the stochastic Wiener process, z r . House values are a function of the expected rate of return on the housing asset, α; the service or rental flow from the house, φ; housing volatility, σ H ; and a stochastic disturbance, z H . The term (α−φ) represents the expected rate of appreciation. While home price appreciation does not impact the valuation of the default option (Kau and Keenan 1995) , it does play a role in determining default risk. Additionally, I re-emphasize that default risk remains zero unless, the cost of the mortgage exceeds the house price; thus the equity stake in the house must be sufficiently low before default is an option considered by the homeowner. Default risk then varies with changes in LTV, the rate of appreciation, the term structure of interest rates and structural changes that affect interest rate and home price volatility.
Reduced form Model
Together the conceptual models for home maintenance and default risk suggest a reduced form empirical model for maintenance expenditures:
The empirical model will estimate this reduced form equation. Income (Y) represents available resources to invest in maintenance expenditures. House value (Q) and neighborhood condition (N) are included to control for factors which likely impact the amount of routine maintenance required for upkeep. Increases in LTV, decreases in interest rates (r), and decreases in HPI all increase default risk. Interest rate and home price volatility also affect default risk, but they are structural characteristics which are difficult to measure on a year-by-year basis. Regardless, during the sample period, the change in volatility would have increased default risk and be correlated with the effects of r and HPI..
Empirical Estimation Strategy
Following Harding et al. (2000) , I first take a cross-sectional approach and estimate the relationship between high LTV mortgages and maintenance expenditures. A log-linear model 1 is specified and estimated using tobit since 10-15 percent of the observations for maintenance expenditures are zero each sample year 2 . According to the AHS codebook maintenance expenditures are also top coded at $9998, but in the final dataset used for analysis, no top coded observations were observed.
Next, I conduct a panel analysis, to better understand the roles of LTV, interest rates, HPI and income in maintenance expenditure decisions while controlling for fixed effects associated with different housing units. A fixed effect tobit model is the preferred estimation scheme since it will allow for control of unobserved heterogeneity across housing units. Unfortunately, consistent estimation of this model is difficult (Baltagi 2008 
Data
American Descriptions of variables used in the empirical study are presented in Tables 1 and   2 . The data contain variables that describe characteristics of the housing unit, the household that occupies the unit, the mortgage on the housing unit and the neighborhood in which the housing unit is located. In each survey year, the sample is limited to owneroccupied, detached, single-family residences for which the full set of housing unit, household and mortgage characteristics are available. Observations with top coded values for the home value, the mortgage amount, the housing unit size, or household income were dropped. Additionally, observations for which the purchase price or estimated home value was less than $10,000, the unit had less than 200 square feet, or the head of household was less than 18 years of age were not considered in the analysis.
Summary statistics for the data used in the cross sectional analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4 
Calculation of LTV
Assumptions must be made when making LTV calculations from data available in the AHS. I follow Harding et al. (2000) who use AHS data to estimate LTV by dividing the original loan amount by the current estimated home value 4 . There are some potential concerns with this method. First, the home value is self-report and assessed by the homeowner. While the self-report values are susceptible to large errors, they are highly relevant when considering the causal role of default risk with regards to homeowner behavior. LTV ratios calculated from self-report home values indicate the equity stake as perceived by the homeowner. According to economic theory it would be the perceived default risk that would cause homeowners to under-invest in their home. Second, using the original (rather than current) outstanding mortgage balance is usually an overestimate of the true LTV since the outstanding loan balance is almost always less than the original loan amount. This methodology provides an approximate upper bound to the true LTV. Since the empirical analysis is interested in determining the degree to which high-LTV homeowners differ from low-LTV homeowners, the bias introduced by using the upper bound for LTV will result in more conservative estimates of this difference.
The continuous variable LTV is used to create dummy variables for various LTV thresholds. 14 percent and 11 percent of the mortgages sampled for the cross-sectional and panel analysis, respectively, have LTV's greater than 0.9. Additionally, the empirical models include controls for various attributes of the mortgage: mortgage age (TIMERES) and loans in which other terms (such as the length of repayment) may vary (CANVAR).
HPI and Interest rate Data
The analysis is facilitated by the large rise and subsequent decline in home prices that occurred in the United States between 2001 and the end of 2009. Rapidly rising home prices ameliorate default risk since homes can easily be sold to cover the outstanding mortgage should a household's financial resources become constrained.
However, when home prices begin to fall, the opposite is true: default risk increases.
Quarterly HPI data was obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Authority 
Results
The estimation strategy involves first performing a cross-sectional analysis of each AHS sample wave and comparing how the relationships between LTV and maintenance expenditures vary during the housing market cycle. Next, a panel dataset is constructed and we directly estimate the impact of HPI and interest rates on maintenance expenditures.
Cross Sectional Analysis
The cross-sectional model was estimated for each AHS sample year. Because the dependent variable (CSTMNT) has a large number of $0 responses, a tobit model was specified 6 . Independent variables include controls for housing unit, household, neighborhood and mortgage characteristics. To facilitate a comparison between model years that will provide insight into the change in the maintenance-LTV relationship as the default risk for a given LTV changes, three models were estimated in each sample year.
Each model includes an LTV threshold variable indicating LTV ratios greater than a specified threshold: 0.7 (LTVGT7), 0.8 (LTVGT8) and 0.9 (LTVGT9). Table 7 displays the full set of coefficient estimates for the LTVGT9 models in each sample year. Only the coefficient estimates of the LTV threshold variables for the remaining models are reported in Table 8 ; all other coefficient estimates are similar to those of the LTVGT9 models. The elasticity of maintenance expenditures with respect to LTV for each LTV category becomes more negative with increasing LTV (Table 8) 
Panel Anaysis
The panel data set was constructed from the AHS cross sections analyzed in section 4.1 and is estimated using fixed effect Tobit model. The estimation results for the panel analysis are displayed in Table 9 8 .
Two models are estimated. However, for all other households, maintenance expenditures did not decrease when default risk increased-in fact, they increased when interest rates dropped during the downturn in the housing market. The empirical results strongly support the model of default risk put forth by Kau, Keenan, et al. (1994) whereby default risk is essentially zero unless the mortgage valuation is in the default region. Households do not decrease maintenance expenditures when default risk increases unless they are likely to be in this region (i.e. high LTV and low income). On the other hand, the empirical results provide no indication that other households (those unlikely to be in the default region) systematically decreased maintenance expenditures because default risk varies.
The explanation for the behavior of these "other" homeowners in response to changes in the interest rate is unknown-but it may be related to factors unassociated with default risk. For example, interest rates decreased during the economic recession triggered by the financial crisis in the mortgage market. Even though interest rates where very low, credit availability was also very low for many households-especially those with lower credit scores. Homeowners may have altered their expected tenure in the house since selling the property in a down market is undesirable and obtaining a new mortgage may have been difficult-longer expected tenure may induce more desire to maintain the property. Alternatively, they may invest more in maintenance in hopes of maintaining the home's value despite the poor market conditions.
Regardless of the explanation for the behavior, the empirical results provide important policy insights. They suggest that many homeowners did not reduce maintenance expenditures because of the housing market declines in 2007 and 2009. Tax incentive programs for home maintenance or energy efficiency upgrades may have increased take-up rates during housing market downturns. If such programs targeted home upgrades that impact neighborhood quality-such as improvements that improve the aesthetic quality of the housing unit-then these programs have the potential to counteract the neighborhood property value declines induced by high foreclosure rates (Harding, Rosenthal et al. 2007; Leonard and Murdoch 2009; Lin, Rosenblatt et al. 2009 ).
Further, the panel analysis finds no evidence that the erosion of home equity alone reduces maintenance expenditures. Instead, it is only individuals at higher risk of default due to both a low-equity stake and income shortfalls that tend to respond to market level changes in default risk.
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